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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,    ) 
      ) 
 Plaintiff-Respondent,  ) NO. 43670 
      ) 
v.      ) KOOTENAI COUNTY NO.  
      )  CR 2014-10233 
HENRY MARTYN HALL,   )  
      ) APPELLANT'S    
 Defendant-Appellant.  )  REPLY BRIEF 
________________________________) 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Henry Martyn Hall moved pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (“Rule 35”) for 
reconsideration of his five-year sentence for burglary. The district court denied his 
motion after a hearing. Mr. Hall appeals. 
  
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in 
Mr. Hall’s Appellant’s Brief. (App. Br., pp.1–3.) They are not repeated in this Reply Brief, 
but are incorporated here by reference. 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Hall’s Rule 35 motion? 
 
 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Hall’s Rule 35 Motion 
 
Mr. Hall argued in his Appellant’s Brief that the district court abused its discretion 
by denying his Rule 35 motion. (App. Br., pp.3–4.) Among other arguments, the State 
responded that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider his motion. (Resp. 
Br., pp.2–3.) Mr. Hall disagrees. He asserts that the district court had jurisdiction.1  
According to Rule 35, a defendant has 120 days from the judgment of conviction 
to file a Rule 35 motion. I.C.R. 35(b). “The court may correct a sentence within 120 days 
after the filing of a judgment of conviction . . . .”  I.C.R. 35(b). The policies served by the 
120-day time limitation include “protecting judges from repeated pleas by those 
sentenced and ensuring that the court does not usurp the responsibilities of parole 
officials by acting on the motion in light of the movant’s conduct while in prison.” State v. 
Simpson, 131 Idaho 196, 197–98 (Ct. App. 1998). However, the 120-day time limitation 
is not absolute:  
[A] district court does not lose jurisdiction to act upon a timely-filed motion 
under Rule 35 merely because the 120-period expires before the judge 
can reasonably consider and act upon the motion.  Allowing a trial court to 
rule within a “reasonable” time will allow the court to fulfill its own duties, 
yet will prevent cases in which the defendant files a timely Rule 35 motion 
at the very end of the 120-day period, for instance on the 119th day, 
leaving the court with only one day to rule on the motion. A strict 
interpretation would, in such a case, be highly impractical and would most 
                                            
1 Mr. Hall’s Reply Brief addresses the State’s jurisdictional argument only. For the 
reasons stated in his Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Hall continues to assert that the district court 
abused its discretion by denying his motion in light of the information presented. (App. 
Br., p.4.)     
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often cause the trial court to lose jurisdiction without ever having a chance 
to consider the motion.  
 
State v. Chapman, 121 Idaho 351, 353–54 (1992). Thus, the district court must act upon 
the Rule 35 motion within “a reasonable time,” or it loses jurisdiction. State v. Shumway, 
144 Idaho 580, 582 (Ct. App. 2007). A delay may be reasonable if the record shows 
“that either party had requested that the motion be held in abeyance, that the delay was 
necessitated by the court’s schedule, that the delay was occasioned by the need to 
obtain more information, or that the extended period was otherwise necessary to decide 
the motion.” Id.  
 In this case, Mr. Hall filed a Rule 35 motion on January 7, 2015, 19 days after the 
district court entered its judgment of conviction. (Aug. R.,2 pp.567–68.) He requested a 
hearing on the motion to present argument or testimony. (Aug. R., p.568.) On 
February 18, 2015, the district court scheduled a hearing, which indicates that it 
determined a hearing would be helpful to address the motion. (Aug. R., p.571; R., p.7 
(Register of Actions (“ROA”)).) The hearing was scheduled for March 20, 2015. (Aug. 
R., p.571; R., p.7 (ROA).) Mr. Hall also moved for an order permitting his telephonic 
participation at the hearing. (Aug. R., pp.569–70.) The district court granted his motion. 
(Aug. R., p.571.) According to the record and ROA, the hearing was vacated or 
continued multiple times:  
 March 20, 2015: Hearing vacated for reasons unclear on the record. 
 April 22, 2015: Hearing rescheduled for June 5, 2015. 
                                            
2 The augmented record refers to the record from the prior appeal of this case, 
No. 42847. See State v. Hall, No. 43670, Order Augmenting Prior Appeal No. 42847 
(Nov. 10, 2015). 
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 June 5, 2015: Hearing held, Mr. Hall participates telephonically and testifies, the 
district court grants the State’s request for a continuance, and hearing 
rescheduled for June 23, 2015. 
 
 June 12, 2015: Hearing (set for June 23) vacated for reasons unclear on the 
record and rescheduled for July 31, 2015. 
 
 July 31, 2015: Hearing held, Mr. Hall’s counsel requests continuance to locate 
Mr. Hall, and hearing rescheduled for October 9, 2015. 
 
 October 9, 2015: Hearing held, Mr. Hall participates telephonically and testifies, 
and district court orally denies motion. 
 
(R., pp.7–8 (ROA); see generally Tr. Vol. I,3 p.3, L.4–p.11, L.20 (State’s continuance); 
Tr. Vol. II, p.5, L.1–p.6, L.23 (Mr. Hall’s continuance); Tr. Vol. III, p.12, L.25–p.13, L.2.) 
In total, 294 days passed between the district court’s judgment of conviction and its oral 
ruling on Mr. Hall’s motion.4 
Although there was a delay of 294 days, there is “ample support in the record for 
the delay.” State v. Veloquio, 141 Idaho 154, 156 (Ct. App. 2005) (finding a delay of 
seven months reasonable under the circumstances). The record indicates that the 
district court wanted to hold a hearing on Mr. Hall’s motion. Some delay in setting the 
hearing and deciding the motion presumably was caused by the district court exercising 
its discretion to manage its calendar and caseload when setting the hearings. 
See Chapman, 121 Idaho at 353 (recognizing that district courts have other obligations 
they need to fulfill besides just dealing with properly-filed Rule 35 motions and thus 
have leeway to schedule and resolve their cases). This type of delay does not 
undermine the policies of the 120-day limitation. See Simpson, 131 Idaho at 197–98. 
                                            
3 There are three transcripts on appeal. The first, cited as Volume I, contains a Rule 35 
motion hearing, held on June 5, 2015. The second, cited as Volume II, contains another 
Rule 35 motion hearing, held on July 31, 2015. The third, cited as Volume III, contains a 
third Rule 35 motion hearing, held on October 9, 2015. 
4 The district court issued a written order 13 days after its oral ruling. (R., p.29.)  
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Considering the demands of a district court and its duty to manage its caseload, Mr. Hall 
contends that it would be unreasonable and “highly impractical” to require district courts 
to decide such motions more quickly than the court did here under the circumstances. 
See Chapman, 121 Idaho at 354.  
The delay in this case also was related to the merits of Mr. Hall’s Rule 35 motion. 
Delay was necessary to locate and contact Mr. Hall in order for him to participate 
telephonically at the hearing and testify in support of his motion. There is no indication 
in the record Mr. Hall had control over his changing location in prison or that he 
intentionally caused the delay. Moreover, the State also contributed to the delay 
because it requested a continuance after the first hearing to follow up on Mr. Hall’s 
claims. (Tr. Vol. I, p.9, Ls.14–18, p.10, Ls.6–10.) Thus, the record shows that the delay 
was reasonable to allow for Mr. Hall to testify and to resolve the merits of his motion. 
See State v. Book, 127 Idaho 352, 355–56 (1995) (holding the district court’s nine-
month delay to give the defendant time to gather additional information in support of his 
Rule 35 motion was reasonable). In light of the circumstances, Mr. Hall submits that the 
district court did not lose jurisdiction to decide his Rule 35 motion. 
  
CONCLUSION 
 Mr. Hall respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s order 
denying his Rule 35 motion and remand this case for further proceedings.   
 DATED this 28th day of April, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      JENNY C. SWINFORD 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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